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Brand Reputation and the Cost of Capital: Evidence of Adopting a Brand 
Name as the Corporate Name 
 
 
YiLin Wu

 
Abstract 
 
This paper studies how the capital market perceives brand name adoption. I distinguish 
between brand adoption and radical type of corporate name change. A brand adoption name 
change occurs when the firm adopts one of its well-established brands as its new corporate 
name and a radical type occurs when the new name is semantically unrelated to firm history. 
Improved profitability and increased net investment accompany brand name adoption. After 
controlling for changes in the competing information sources, the accompanying improved 
economic performance, and the endogeneity of the decision to adopt a brand name, I find that, 
while there are no intertemporal variations in the cost of capital for a radical name change, a 
brand name adoption is associated with a lower cost of capital following the name change, 
suggesting that brand reputation is a valuable asset. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Kreps (1990) and Tadelis (1999) propose that corporate names bear brand name or reputation 
capital. Hall (2001) documents that intangible assets like reputation account for an important 
part of a firm’s value. Diamond (1991) and Tirole (2001) contend that a firm’s reputational 
capital can reduce the extent of moral hazard and is thus conducive to a lower cost of capital 
and a greater availability of external financing. Given that corporate name changes are a 
common practice (Wu (2010)), it is surprising that there is limited scholarly attention to the 
impact of the brand reputation component on the cost of capital. However, considerable 
financial press has already emphasized the value of the corporate brand. For instance:
 
 
 
Many savvy companies are starting to realize that a good name can be their most important 
asset…which enables companies to hone their message to attain specific financial outcomes. 
—BusinessWeek, July 9, 2007 
 
To examine the cost of capital effect of a brand name, I identify 890 name changes 
and classify them into 697 brand-adoption name changes and 193 radical name changes. A 
brand-adoption name change involves changing the corporate name to one of its prominent 
brand names, such as when Blue Arrow Corporation changed its name to Manpower in 1989. 
Chairman Mitchell Fromstein explained that “Since Manpower is the multinational brand, it 
                                               
 YiLin Wu is an associate professor at the National Taiwan University. Her teaching centers around financial 
management, corporate finance, capital market and derivatives. Her current research interests include corporate 
finance issues relevant to entrepreneurial ventures and small firms, and private placements and small business 
financing. 
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is appropriate to choose it as the new name” (The New York Times, December 14, 1989). 
The contrasting type of name change, a radical name change, refers to a name change where 
the old and the new names bear no semantic relation and the new name lacks association with 
the firm’s history, such as when Cook Data Services became Blockbuster Entertainment Corp 
in 1990. Founder David P. Cook said that “Our company departed from the distressed oil and 
gas industry and entered the video rental business, thus, the old name is no longer appropriate” 
(PR Newswire, March 20, 1986). 
A prevalent marketing practice introduces new products in different categories under 
the same name as a well-established brand, and the academic literature argues that this 
practice makes it possible to launch new products at a lower cost for a given level of sales 
(Smith and Park (1992)).
1
 This study proposes that the cost of capital is lower after 
brand-adoption name changes through at least two channels. First, brand-adoption name 
changes play an information transmission role (Easley and O'Hara (2004)). By elevating the 
well-established brand name from the level of products, subsidiaries, or divisions to the 
whole firm, the firm capitalizes on its good reputation and thus alleviates the informational 
asymmetry problem encountered by the rest of the firm (Cabral (2009)). Investors expect that 
the firm’s prospects are good as long as the performance history and prospects of the brand is 
good. Second, brand-adoption name changes play a valuable bonding role by associating the 
brand capital (or reputation capital) with the firm’s prospects (Choi (1998)). When investors 
perceive that performance is below expectations the brand capital suffers damage, which is a 
strong disincentive to adopting brand name changes. Accordingly, firms will not make 
brand-adoption name changes unless their prospects are sufficiently positive. In contrast, this 
study proposes that radical name changes have a negligible effect on the cost of capital. A 
radical name change cannot alleviate information asymmetry because investors have limited 
knowledge of what is behind the new corporate name nor can a radical name change 
guarantee the firm’s prospects because the firm has ‘nothing to lose’ if its future performance 
turns out to be poor. 
To evaluate the effect of brand-adoption name changes on the cost of capital, it is 
important to control for changes in the competing information sources, the endogeneity of the 
decision to adopt a brand name, and the accompanying improved economic performance. 
This is because the information revealed by alternative sources is likely to subsume or 
mitigate the information transmission role of brand-adoption name changes. In addition, Wu 
(2010) documents that a firm with better past performance, or more favorable public 
perception tends to make a brand-adoption name change instead of a radical name change. If 
a firm with good past performance tends to make a brand-adoption name change and tends to 
have a lower cost of capital, then not taking into account the effect of past performance on the 
name-change decision will result in attributing the lower cost of capital only to the 
brand-adoption name change, rather than partly to the good past performance. To account for 
this self-selection bias, I implement Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure, in which the first 
stage estimates a probit regression of the choices of new names to get the correction for 
self-selection parameter, which is then added to the second-stage regression analysis of the 
cost of capital effect of the brand name adoption.  
To examine whether firm uses its brand capital as a bond for improved performance by 
adopting the brand name as the corporate name, I define real name changes as those name 
changes that lead to improved performance and cosmetic name changes as those name 
changes that lead to little or no improved performance. For a brand-adoption name change to 
                                               
1 For example, Canon establishes its reputation as a maker of photographic cameras. In the mid-1970s, it entered 
into the market for photocopiers, under the same brand name (Cabral (2000)).  
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bond the firm’s prospects, the capital market should be able to separate (even imperfectly) the 
two types of name changes (brand-adoption versus radical name changes) from the two 
natures of name changes (real versus cosmetic) and most brand-adoption name changes 
should be real name changes whereas most radical name changes should be cosmetic in 
nature.  
The result supports the view that the brand capital (or reputation capital) is associated 
with the firm’s prospects. Not surprisingly, I document that the accompanying changes in 
economic performance of firms making brand-adoption name changes are improved Tobin’s 
Q, improved profitability, and increased net investments. In contrast, the accompanying 
changes in economic performance of firms making radical name changes are decreased 
external financing and net investments. The result indicates that most brand-adoption name 
changes are real name changes, whereas most radical name changes are cosmetic in nature. 
This finding is different from Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2005) that the accompanying changes 
in mutual fund flows are similar across funds with hot investment-style new names regardless 
of whether or not the subsequent funds’ holdings match the hot new names. The difference in 
finding could be due to that mutual fund investors are predominantly individuals who are 
considered irrational and thus the changes in mutual fund flows might indicate 
unsophisticated investors’ misperceptions (Warther (1995), Cha and Lee (2001), and Brown 
and Cliff (2005)). 
The empirical results are broadly consistent with the idea that brand names are a 
valuable asset and are thus conducive to a lower cost of capital. The accounting-based 
implied cost of equity capital is lower after brand-adoption name changes. In contrast, there 
are no significant intertemporal variations in the accounting-based implied cost of equity 
capital for radical name change firms. The results are robust to measuring the cost of equity 
capital using the Fama-French’s (1993) three factors and Pastor-Stambaugh’s (2003) traded 
liquidity factor asset pricing model. Specifically, the market risk is reduced after the 
brand-adoption name change. The average reduction in market risk of 0.220, induced by the 
brand-adoption name change, translates into an average reduction of 1.99% per annum in the 
cost of equity capital. This is around a 10.95% reduction in the average 18.150% per annum 
pre-brand-adoption name change cost of equity capital. To measure the cost of debt capital, I 
use the firm’s credit rating, the at-issue bond credit ratings, and at-issue yield spreads for 
144A private placements, traditional private placements, and public fixed-rate nonconvertible 
bonds. The result shows a lower cost of debt after a brand-adoption name change. 
The effect of a brand-adoption name change on the cost of capital becomes stronger 
after controlling for the accompanying economic performance. Following a two-stage 
procedure, in which the first stage orthogonalizes the variables measuring the economic 
natures of name changes to the dummy indicating the types of name changes, I then replace 
the economic performance with the orthogonalized residuals for the economic performance in 
the second-stage regression of the cost of capital and find increases in the magnitude and the 
significance of the coefficient of the brand name change dummy. This finding reinforces the 
idea that brand-adoption name changes play a valuable bonding role by associating the brand 
capital with the firm’s prospects. To check the bonding role of brand-adoption name changes, 
I examine class action lawsuits in which shareholders sue the firms because of financial 
misrepresentation in the three years following the name changes.
2
 The mean estimated brand 
                                               
2 Class action lawsuits are shareholder lawsuits against the firm, officers, directors and other related parties 
resulting from financial misrepresentation. Shareholders sue the firms because the public reports contain 
materially false and misleading statements about the firms’ prospects or the firms fail to disclose materially 
important information that causes the stock price to be artificially inflated. 
31
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance Volume 15, Issue 2, Winter 2011 
 
 
reputation loss due to financial misrepresentation is significant at almost $87.5 million for 
firms making brand-adoption name changes. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and section 4 analyzes the cost of capital effects of a 
brand-adoption name change. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Hypotheses and Related Literature  
 
The real world evidence points to corporate names as a bearer for brand reputation.
3
 Based on 
the literature on brand reputation, this section derives four testable hypotheses on the effect of a 
brand-adoption name change on the cost of capital. 
HYPOTHESIS 1 (henceforth H1): The brand-adoption name change reduces the cost of 
capital due to its capacity to transmit private information, or its capacity to bond future 
performance, or both. 
According to H1, the first effect of the brand-adoption name change on the cost of 
capital is its capacity to reduce adverse selection cost. By elevating a well-established brand 
name from products, subsidiaries, or divisions to the firm level, the firm extends the brand 
capital to the overall firm and capitalizes on its good reputation.
4
 Investors expect that the 
firm’s prospects are good as long as the performance history and prospects of the brand name 
is good. Without brand name adoption, the rest of the firm may suffer from adverse selection 
cost like foregoing profitable investment opportunities (Myers and Majluf (1984)). Therefore, 
the value of a brand name adoption includes at least the realization of profitable growth 
opportunities and the brand’s potential for reducing adverse selection cost.  
The second effect of the brand-adoption name change on the cost of capital is its 
capacity to bond firm prospects through brand reputation. If the company cannot deliver the 
investors’ expectations, under the same name as the brand, then the brand reputation is 
spoiled, which is a strong disincentive to adopting a brand name. Consequently, adopting a 
brand name can be more costly than creating a new name when poor performance harms the 
firm’s brand capital. 
In contrast to the brand-adoption name change, the radical name change cannot 
alleviate information asymmetry nor guarantee future performance. This is because investors 
have limited knowledge of what is behind the new name, and the new name has no 
reputational capital to lose if the firm’s performance turns out to be poor.  
                                               
3 For example, California Microwave sold its information systems division to Northrop Grumman for $98 
million. The California Microwave name has such a great reputation among the intelligence community that the 
company name is part of the sales agreement (Business Wire, March 11, 1999). Actinium, an internet 
professional services firm focused on customer relationship solutions, changes its name to Digital Lighthouse, 
which is derived from Lighthouse Consulting Group, a nationally recognized consulting firm which the 
Company acquired for $2.91 million (PR Newswire, September 7, 2000). Atrion purchased the cardiovascular 
services product lines, including the rights to the old name Quest Medical for approximately $24 million in cash 
on December 30, 1997. Quest Medical announced that it has changed its corporate name to Advanced 
Neuromodulation Systems (PR Newswire; June 18, 1998). Fuqua Enterprises purchased the assets of Lumex 
health care division, including the rights to the old name “Lumex” for $ 40.75 million in cash (PR Newswire). 
Transamerica Corp acquired container rental division, including the old name “Tiphook” for $1,200 million 
(The Times). The other cases in which corporate names are viewed as a tradeable asset are available from the 
author upon request. 
4 A counter example is the case of the 1982 Tylenol poisoning. Mitchell (1989, P. 612) documents that Johnson 
& Johnson, the producer of Tylenol, made extensive attempts to downplay the connection between it and 
Tylenol. Mitchell (1989, P. 613) interprets this action as suggesting that Johnson & Johnson was fearful that 
consumers might associate the company name with the poisonings, thereby damaging its reputation across its 
entire product line. 
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HYPOTHESIS 2 (henceforth H2): If self-selection in the choices of new names exists, after 
controlling for firm-specific characteristics that affect the choices of new names using 
Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure, there should be a corresponding decrease in the 
magnitude and the significance of the coefficient of the name change dummy (one for 
brand-adoption name changes and zero for radical name changes) and a negative coefficient 
of the self-selection parameter in the regression model of the cost of capital.  
A firm is likely to adopt the name of one of its well-recognized brands when there are 
net gains and to stay away from a radically different name when there are net costs, and vice 
versa. Wu (2010) shows that the choices of new names are related to the firm-specific 
characteristics linked to reputation. Failure to control for these firm-specific characteristics, 
which lead the firm to adopt a brand name and lead the firm to have a lower cost of capital, 
the estimated effect of the brand name adoption on the cost of capital could be biased 
upwards. To evaluate properly the effect of brand name adoption on the cost of capital, I 
implement Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure, in which the first stage estimates a probit 
regression of the choices of new names to get the correction for self-selection parameter, 
which is then added to the second-stage regression model of the cost of capital effect of the 
brand name adoption. If the firm-specific characteristics are partially responsible for the 
lower cost of capital following the brand name adoption, then we should observe a drop in 
the magnitude and the significance of the coefficient of the name change dummy and a 
negative estimated coefficient of self-selection parameter in the second-stage regression.   
HYPOTHESIS 3 (henceforth H3): For the brand-adoption name changes to guarantee future 
performance, most brand-adoption name changes should be real name changes that lead to 
improved performance whereas most radical name changes should be cosmetic in nature that 
lead to little or no improved performance. 
To examine whether firm uses its brand capital as a pledge for improved performance 
by adopting the brand name as the corporate name, I separate the two economic natures of 
name changes (real versus cosmetic) within each type of name change (brand adoption versus 
radical change). Real name changes are name changes that lead to improved performance and 
cosmetic name changes are name changes that lead to little or no improved performance. In 
equilibrium, firms adopt brand names only when they are confident about the prospects. 
Otherwise the poor performance would damage the pledged brand capital. Consequently, 
most brand-adoption name changes should be real name changes and most radical name 
changes should be cosmetic in nature.  
HYPOTHESIS 4 (henceforth H4): If brand-adoption name changes play a bonding role, 
after replacing the economic natures of name changes with the orthogonalized residuals for 
the economic natures of name changes, there should be a corresponding increase in the 
magnitude and the significance of the coefficient of the name change dummy in the regression 
model of the cost of capital.  
H3 predicts that firms adopting brand names tend to be accompanied by increased 
investment and improved performance. To extract the bonding role of brand-adoption name 
changes from the accompanying economic performance, I implement a two-step procedure, 
in which the first stage orthogonalizes the accompanying economic performance to the name 
change dummy. The magnitude and the significance of the coefficient of the name change 
dummy in the second-stage regression model of the cost of capital should increase after 
replacing the economic natures of name changes with the orthogonalized residuals. 
To further investigate whether corporate misconduct will spoil the pledged brand 
capital for brand-adoption name changes (Klein and Leffler (1981) and Ippolito (1990)), 
similar to Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008), I examine class action lawsuits brought by 
shareholders against the firm, officers, directors, and other related parties as a result of 
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financial misrepresentation during the three years following a name change.  
 
3. The Data and Summary Statistics  
a. Sample Formation and Variable Construction 
 
To construct a sample of new names likely to carry the brand capital component and their 
comparisons, I first obtain the CRSP name change records during the 1980–2000 period, and 
then obtain name change announcement dates and reported reasons for the changes in 
question from the company news file in the Lexis-Nexis database, the Dow Jones Interactive 
database, and SEC filings (Proxy Statements, Annual Reports to Shareholders, Forms 8-K, 
10-Q, and 10-K). The announcement date of the name change is the earlier of the press date 
or SEC filing date. The name changes that occur as a direct consequence of mergers and 
acquisitions in the prior one year, or other confounding events are excluded from the final 
sample.
5
 Information on the brand names is collected from the Lexis-Nexis database (the 
Directory of Corporate Affiliations file and the business description item in the S&P 
Corporate Descriptions file), the products item of the Hoover Profiles database, and brand 
data from the Global Market Information database. The final sample consists of 697 
brand-adoption name changes and 193 radical name changes. 
The sample period begins in 1980 and ends in 2000. This sample period is well suited 
for the purposes of this study for two major reasons. First, Irvine and Pontiff (2009) document 
that idiosyncratic volatility of earnings, cash flows, and sales increases dramatically in the 
post-2000 period (see Figure 2 of Irvine and Pontiff (2009)). An explanation offered for 
increased idiosyncratic volatility is increased competition, which is attributable to consumers 
demonstrating less loyalty to a given firm’s product. A reduction in consumer loyalty could 
occur when branding is a less important feature for the product.
6
 A decrease in the value of 
brand names implies that the effectiveness of the bonding role and information transmission 
role proposed by the literature might be diminishing over the 2000s. 
Second, while Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau (2001) document a surge of dot.com 
additions during the bubble boom period, Cooper, Khorana, Osobov, Patel, and Rau (2005) 
document a surge of dot.com deletions following the bubble burst (post-2000 period). These 
results suggest that corporate name change decision varies between the market upturn and 
downturn. 
In sum, this study focuses on name change data that have many homogeneous 
characteristics over the 1980–2000 period, so the importance of brand-name adoption should 
be untainted by the trend towards increasing product market competition, the burst of the 
Nasadq bubble, and related fallout.  
Table 1 presents the definitions of the key analysis variables including the measures 
of cost of capital, economic nature of the name change, information environment, and 
accounting-based intangible assets. The cost of capital is measured on the year prior to the 
name change and on the end of the third year following the name change. The explanatory 
variables in the cost of capital regressions are measured on the prior year relative to the cost 
of capital. Firms take time to plan and execute investment. To assess whether firms adopting 
brand names are accompanied by major increases in net investments, I therefore delay 
measuring the cost of capital until the third year following the name change. I perform 
sensitivity tests of this single-year measure by using the three-year (or two-year) average and 
the median values in the empirical tests. 
                                               
5 The confounding events include changes in organizational structures (e.g., changes to holding companies), 
re-incorporation, stock splits or reverse stock splits, changes in stock exchanges, or changes in legal status.  
6 Bils and Klenow (2004) provide empirical evidence of a more competitive product pricing. 
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This paper measures the cost of equity capital using five measures of 
accounting-based implied cost of equity capital, which differ in the assumptions concerning 
the earnings growth rate, and using the Fama-French’s (1993) three factors and 
Pastor-Stambaugh’s (2003) traded liquidity factor asset pricing model to fit the ex post 
realized returns. This paper uses three measures of the cost of debt capital: the firm’s credit 
rating, the at-issue bond credit rating, and the corresponding at-issue yield spreads for 144A 
private placements, traditional private placements, and public fixed-rate nonconvertible 
bonds. The bond issuance data are collected from Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum U.S. 
New Issues database. 
To capture important changes in the economic performance accompany the brand 
name adoption, I primarily use the statement of cash flows data (Bradshaw, Richardson, and 
Sloan (2006) and Frank and Goyal (2003)). The total funds from operations scaled by log of 
sales (IFIN/ln(sales)) and Tobin’s Q measure firm profitability and growth opportunities, 
respectively. The external financing (EFIN/ln(cap)) is measured as net equity financing plus 
net debt financing scaled by log of market value of equity. The net investment (INV/ln(cap)) 
is measured as the sum of capital expenditures, increases in long-term investments, 
acquisitions, and other uses of funds not classified elsewhere minus the sale of property, plant, 
and equipment, and minus the sale of investments. In addition, an indicator variable called 
‘Real’ equals one for firms with profitability improvements/net investment increases after the 
name changes take place, and zero otherwise. 
To examine whether the information transmission role of the brand name adoption is 
robust to the inclusion of competing information sources, this paper includes the following 
measures of information sources: the number of equity analysts obtained from detail I/B/E/S, 
share turnover (Turnover), institutional ownership (Institution) obtained from CDA/Spectrum 
institutional (13f) holdings, leverage, and the existence of bank loans (Bankdebt, Compustat 
#206). This paper adopts the following three accounting-based proxies for intangible assets: 
advertising expenses, R&D expenses, and balance sheet intangibles including goodwill 
(Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols (2001) and Barron, Byard, Kile, and Riedl (2002)).  
b. Are Brand-Adoption Name Changes Economically Motivated?  
Table 2 reports results on the prediction of H3 that most brand-adoption name changes are 
economically motivated while radical name changes are cosmetic. Table also reports the 
percentage of firms with at least zero increase in the variables after the name changes. Panel 
A shows that the firm characteristics of those making brand-adoption name changes are 
significantly different from those making radical name changes. In general, prior to the name 
changes, firms making brand-adoption name changes are associated with smaller external 
financing and greater net investments than firms making radical name changes. Following the 
name changes, firms making brand-adoption name changes also are associated with greater 
Tobin’s Q, profitability, external financing, and net investments. The significance levels hold 
when internally generated cash flows are scaled by the natural log of the market value of 
equity and net investments are scaled by the natural log of sales. The results generally support 
H3 that a majority of firms making brand-adoption name changes are accompanied by 
improved Tobin’s Q, improved profitability measured by IFIN/ln(sales), and increased net 
investments after name changes, while a majority of firms making radical name changes are 
accompanied by reduced external financing and net investments after name changes. 
Panel B shows no apparent differences in the level of information asymmetry prior to 
the name changes. However, firms with brand-adoption name changes have a significantly 
greater number of equity analysts and institutional ownership, but lower leverage ratios, 
following the name changes. Within each name change category, except for an increase in the 
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number of equity analysts and a reduction in bank debt, there are no apparent changes in the 
information environment around the name changes. 
Panel C shows that advertising expenses are greater for the brand-adoption name 
change firms relative to the radical name change firms. Because many firms report zero 
advertising expenses and R&D expenses. After counting only firms with positive advertising 
expenses and R&D expenses, the unreported results show no differences between 
brand-adoption name change firms and radical name change firms for either measure. Panel 
C shows an increase in balance sheet intangibles (Goodwill, #33 + #204), which suggests an 
increase in the acquisitions of firms and/or intangible assets after brand adoption name 
changes.
7
 Overall, the finding in Table 2 provides some insights about the asset structures of 
the two types of name-changing firms. Specifically, firms have increased physical asset 
investments and/or intangible asset investments after brand adoption name changes. The 
significance levels in Table 2 are robust to measuring the variables over the three years (or 
two years) prior to and following the name changes.  
 
4. Empirical Results  
 
This section first presents results of the basic prediction that a brand-adoption name change is 
associated with a lower cost of capital subsequent to the name change. It then uses three 
econometric techniques to examine through what channels the brand-adoption name change 
reduces the cost of capital. 
 
a. The Basic Results  
Table 3 presents results of the basic prediction that a brand-adoption name change is associated 
with a lower cost of capital subsequent to the name change, whereas there are no intertemporal 
variations in the cost of capital for a firm making radical name change.  
The first five rows of Table 3 present the estimated accounting-based implied cost of 
equity capital at one fiscal year prior to and three fiscal years following the name changes. The 
first three implied costs of equity are Easton’s (2004) , , PEGPE rr and .MPEGr The 
fourth implied 
cost of equity,
 
,OJr  is estimated from the Ohlson-Juettner model in Gode and Mohanram 
(2003). The last implied cost of equity,
 
,RIVr  is estimated from the residual income valuation 
model in Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001). Consistent with Easton’s (2004), the median 
PEr is lower than the median , PEGr which is lower than the median .MPEGr The estimates of OJr
and RIVr  are close to those of Guay, Kothari, and Shu’s (2005). 
The first five rows of Table 3 show no differences in the implied cost of equity capital 
prior to the name changes. In contrast, after the name changes, three out of five models show 
significantly lower implied cost of equity capital for firms with brand-adoption name changes 
than do firms with radical name changes. Consistent with H1, three (four) out of five models 
show lower mean (median) estimated cost of equity capital following the brand-adoption 
name changes, whereas there are no intertemporal variations in the mean (median) estimated 
costs of equity capital for firms making radical name changes. 
The last three rows of Table 3 present the estimated cost of debt. The firm’s most senior 
bond rating usually captures a firm’s credit rating and is updated as the bond seasons (Mansi, 
Maxwell, and Miller (2004)). By requiring that the bond ratings are available as of the fiscal 
year prior to the name changes and the third fiscal year following the name changes, I am left 
                                               
7 Compustat annual data item 33 reports the unamortized value of intangible assets and Compustat annual data 
item 204 reports the excess of cost over equity of an acquired company. 
36
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance Volume 15, Issue 2, Winter 2011 
 
 
with 171 observations prior to and 194 observations following the name changes. As to the 
at-issue bond credit ratings and yield spreads for fixed-rate nonconvertible bonds, there are 43 
bond offerings for 43 firms prior to and 273 bond offerings for 93 firms (66 firms have a single 
bond offering) following the brand-adoption name changes. There is no bond offering prior to 
the radical name changes. There are 33 bond offerings for 28 firms (25 firms have a single bond 
offering) subsequent to the radical name changes.
8
 Following Beatty, Liao, and Weber (2010), 
for firms with rated debt, the categorical credit rating is one if the rating is between SD (D) and 
B+, two if the rating is between BB- and BB+, three if the rating is between BBB- and BBB+, 
and four if their rating is between A- and AAA. 
The last three rows of Table 3 show that firms with brand-adoption name changes have 
better credit ratings, better at-issue bond credit ratings, and lower yield spreads than do firms 
with radical name changes. Note that, compared to the seasoned bond credit ratings, the 
at-issue bond credit ratings are generally lower. For example, in the post-brand-adoption name 
change period, the mean firm’s credit rating is 2.70 and the mean at-issue bond credit rating is 
2.02, which belongs to the speculative grade. A possible explanation may be that the seasoned 
bonds are less sensitive to adverse selection costs. Consistent with H1, firms with 
brand-adoption name changes are associated with significant improvements in the mean 
(median) firm credit ratings, at-issue bond credit ratings, and yield spreads after the name 
changes. This finding suggests that credit ratings are responsive to new information. As the 
firm elevates its well-recognized brand to be its corporate name, the levered brand capital 
transmits private information and is thus conducive to higher at-issue credit ratings and lower 
at-issue yield spreads. 
In addition to the accounting-based implied cost of equity capital, I estimate the cost of 
equity capital using the Fama-French’s (1993) three factors and Pastor-Stambaugh’s (2003) 
traded liquidity factor asset pricing model and apply Petersen’s (2009) two-way-clustering 
panel data model (clustered by firm identifier and name-change announcement year) to 
account for the non-independence of standard errors. The following time-series model 
examines changes in each individual firm i’s risks from before to after the name changes: 
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where tD =1 if t is in the post-name change period, and tD =0 if t is in the 
pre-name-change period; , , , 0,0,0, iii HS and 0,iL  are firm i’s pre-name change market risk, 
beta on size factor, beta on book-to-market factor, and liquidity risk, respectively; 
, , , 1,1,1, iii HS and 1,iL are the differences between its post- and pre-name-change market risk, 
beta on size factor, beta on book-to-market factor, and liquidity risk, respectively; 
0,i is its 
pre-name-change abnormal return; and
1,i is the difference between its post- and 
pre-name-change abnormal return. To avoid the name-change announcement effect, Eq. (1) is 
estimated for each firm for t from month -36 to month -2 prior to the name change 
                                               
8 To be more specific, in the pre-brand adoption name change period, there are one 144A private placement, 31 
traditional private placements, and 11 public bond offerings for 43 firms. In the post-brand adoption name 
change period, there are 38 144A private placements, 103 traditional private placements, 132 public bond 
offerings for 93 firms and 66 of them have a single bond offering. There is no bond offering prior to the radical 
name changes. There are 8 144A private placements, 20 traditional private placements, and 5 public bond 
offerings subsequent to the radical name changes for 28 firms and 25 of them have a single bond offering during 
the post-radical name change period.  
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announcement month and from month +2 to month +36 after the name change announcement 
month. To ensure that the factor loadings are estimated with sufficient observations, the 
estimation excludes firms that have fewer than 12 monthly returns in the pre-name change 
period and firms that have fewer than 12 monthly returns in the post-name change period. 
This procedure results in 647 brand-adoption name change firms and 161 radical name 
change firms. 
Table 4 reports the averages of time series results of the estimation of the model in Eq. 
(1). Panel A shows that the averages of the firms making brand-adoption name changes 
experience a significant reduction in market risk—the 1 is -0.22 (p=0.063), and size 
beta—the 1S  is -0.23 (p=0.085) in the post-name-change period. However, Panel B shows 
no evidence of intertemporal variations in the systemic risk for firms making radical name 
changes. 
How much would the cost of equity capital be reduced for the firms making 
brand-adoption name changes because of lower market risk? I estimate their representative 
cost of equity capital by annualizing the following expected monthly return on individual 
firm i:  
).(*)(*)(*)(*)( ,,,,,,,,, itiitiitiitfitmitfit LIQELHMLEHSMBESrrErrE   (2) 
The unconditional monthly means of , , ,  , ,,,,,, itititfitmft HMLSMBrrr  and itLIQ , over 
the period 1980-2000 proxy for ),( ),( ),(  , ,,,,,, itititfitmft HMLESMBErrEr  and ),( ,itLIQE
which are 0.553%, 0.746%, -0.033%, 0.336%, and 0.414%, respectively. Thus, an average 
reduction in market risk, induced by the brand-adoption name change, of 0.220 translates into 
an average reduction of 1.99 percentage points per annum in the cost of equity capital. This is 
a sizable reduction—a 10.95% reduction in the cost of equity capital—because the average 
pre-name-change period cost of equity capital is 18.150% per annum.  
The estimated cost of equity capital does not seem to vary much across models. 
Estimates from the asset pricing model in Eq. (2) of the average 18.150% cost of equity 
capital per annum are close to the average 17.038% PEGr  and 15.739% MPEGr implied costs 
of equity capital during the pre-brand-adoption name change period.  
b. The Regression Results  
This section uses three econometric techniques to examine through what channels do the 
brand-adoption name changes reduce the cost of capital? Specifically, this section examines 
whether brand-adoption name changes play an information transmission role by alleviating 
the informational asymmetry problem, play a bonding role by associating the brand 
reputation with the firm’s prospects, or both. 
b.1. The Probit Estimation of Choices of New Names  
To control for firm-specific characteristics that lead a firm to adopt brand name and lead a 
firm to have a lower cost of capital, I follow Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure, in 
which the first stage estimates a probit regression of the choices of new names. The estimates 
are used to get the correction for self-selection parameter, which is then added to the 
second-stage regression model of the cost of capital reported below. The choices of new 
names for firm i have the following specification:  
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where *,tiAdoption is an unobserved latent variable, tiAdoption , is a dummy that 
equals one for firm i adopting a brand name and zero for firm i choosing a radically different 
new name,
tiZ , is a set of firm-specific characteristics that affect the choices of new names, 
and 
tiu , is an error term. 
Table 5 estimates Eq. (3) using a probit model. Consistent with Wu (2010), Table 5 
shows that, indeed, firm-specific characteristics are significant in explaining the choices of 
the two types of new names. Superior past performance (Tobin’s Q, IFIN/ln(caps), and 
INV/ln(caps)), more neutral and good media coverage, less bad media coverage, a greater 
number of reported brands, a larger physical capital, smaller bid/ask spreads, a greater 
number of equity analysts following, a greater institutional ownership, and a lower leverage 
ratio generally increase the probability of adopting one of the established brand names as the 
new corporate name. 
b.2. Three Intertemporal Regression Models  
The basic OLS intertemporal regression model of the cost of capital has the following 
specification:  
(4)                                                                                                     ,
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where 
tfti rr ,,  is the estimated cost of equity capital for firm i at time t measured at 
the year-end prior to the name changes and at the end of the third year following the name 
changes. tD is an indicator variable that takes the value of one after the name changes and 
otherwise zero.
tiAdoption , is a dummy that equals one for firm i adopting a brand name and 
zero for firm i choosing a radically different new name.
tit AdoptionD ,* measures the impact 
of brand-name adoption on the cost of equity capital. As noted earlier, a negative value of 1
means that the cost of equity capital is reduced after the brand-adoption name changes. To 
minimize endogeneity, the explanatory variables have a one year lag. To control for changes 
in the competing information sources, Eq. (4) includes
1, tinInformatio , a vector of firm i 
information sources measured at time t-1. To control for changes in economic performance 
following the brand-adoption name changes, Eq. (4) includes
1, tiePerformanc , a vector of 
firm i economic performance measured at time t-1. In addition, Eq. (4) controls for 
accounting-based intangibles, volatility, and price momentum (Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2001)). 
To extract the bonding role of brand-adoption name changes from the accompanying 
economic performance, I implement a two-step procedure, in which the first stage 
orthogonalizes the vector of firm i economic performance to
tit AdoptionD ,* . The vector 
regression specification is 
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A positive value of 2 means that firms adopting brand names tend to be accompanied 
by improved performance. The
1, tiePerformanc in Eq. (4) is replaced with the orthogonalized 
residuals of Eq. (5). The second-stage regression (i.e., a hybrid intertemporal multiple 
regression) becomes 
 
)6(                                                                                                    .
*
  ,31,3
1,,231,3,3,303003,,
titi
tititittittfti
Controls
nInformatioAdoptionDAdoptionDrr






 
The vector Eq. (5) is substituted into Eq. (4) and the second-stage regression becomes 
(7)  .)*(
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To examine whether the accompanying improved performance has any material 
impact on the relationship between
tit AdoptionD ,* and the cost of capital, Eq. (7) is 
rearranged in terms of: 
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If brand-adoption name changes play a bonding role by associating the brand 
reputation with the firm’s prospect, by comparison with Eq. (4), then the coefficient of
tit AdoptionD ,* in Eqs. (6) and (7) will be more negative (i.e., 1211   ). This is because 
firms adopting brand names are accompanied by improved performance ( 02  ) and cost of 
equity capital is lower after improved performance ( )01  . 
Turning to the issue of how to control for self selection bias, the expected cost of 
equity capital for firm i adopting a brand name is 
.)1(...)1( ,,11,11101001,,,   titititttitfti AdoptionEnInformatioDDAdoptionrrE 
 
Similarly, the expected cost of equity capital for firm i choosing a radically different 
new name is 
.)0(...)0( ,,11,11001,,,   tititittitfti AdoptionEnInformatioDAdoptionrrE   
The difference in the cost of equity capital is given by  
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Assuming that the errors in Eqs. (3) and (4), 
tiu , and ti,1 , have a bivariate normal 
distribution with means of zero, standard deviation 1 and 1 , and with correlation . We 
have  
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(.) and (.) are, respectively, the density and cumulative distribution functions of the 
standard normal. The difference in the cost of equity capital of firm adopting a brand name 
and firm choosing a radically different new name is then given by  
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The right-hand side of Eq. (8) is what is actually estimated by the OLS coefficient of
tiAdoption , in Eq. (4). In line with Heckman’s two-step procedure, Table 5 estimates Eq. (3) 
using a probit model to get consistent estimates of . These are then used to get estimates of
1  and 2 , the correction for self-selection. The second-step regression 
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The estimated impact of brand-name adoption, using OLS in Eq. (4), will be biased 
downward where  , the correlation of the error terms in Eqs. (3) and (4), is negative. By 
comparison with Eq. (4), after control for self selection in the choices of new names, the 
coefficient of
tiAdoption , in Eq. (9) will be less negative when the firm-specific characteristics 
that lead the firms to adopt brand names also lead to a lower cost of capital ( 0 ).  
Table 6 presents eight intertemporal regressions of accounting-based implied cost of 
equity capital, measured by
fMPEG rr  . For brevity, the results of the other four 
accounting-based implied cost of equity capital models are omitted because they are 
qualitatively similar. Columns (1) to (4) present the OLS results. Columns (1) and (2) show 
the OLS results without the key test variable:
tit AdoptionD ,* , which illustrate the incremental 
explanatory power of the key test variable as well as the effects of the other explanatory 
variables. Columns (3) and (4) add the key test variable to the OLS regressions. Columns (5) 
and (6) show the second-stage results after replacing the Performance covariates with the 
orthogonalized residuals. Columns (7) and (8) show the second-stage results after adding the 
correction for self-selection (Lambda in Eq. (9)). 
Columns (3) and (4) show that after adding the name change dummy, in general, the 
coefficients of the Performance covariates are smaller, compared to the estimates in columns 
(1) and (2). The Wald test shows that the Performance covariates are jointly less significant in 
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columns (3) and (4), compared to columns (1) and (2). For example, the Performance 
covariates are jointly significant at P-values of 0.075 and 0.097 in columns (2) and (4), 
respectively. Using estimates in columns (3) and (4), an average reduction in the cost of 
equity capital, induced by the brand-adoption name change, is around 1.36 percentage points 
to 2.42 percentage points. 
The results in columns (3) and (4) support the view that brand-adoption name changes 
play an information transmission role. In spite of the significance of the variables measuring 
competing information sources (except for institutional ownership and the bank debt dummy), 
the coefficients of
tit AdoptionD ,* are significantly negative in all specifications. The other 
variables in the regressions have the signs suggested by previous research in almost all cases. 
Greater volatility in stock returns (Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003)) and forecast earnings 
variability (e.g., Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001)) are associated with a larger cost of 
equity capital. Conversely, firms with higher recent price momentum tend to have a lower 
cost of equity capital. 
The results in columns (5) and (6) support the view that brand-adoption name changes 
play a bonding role. If the bonding role of the brand-adoption name changes is extracted from 
the economic outcomes accompanying the name changes, then the coefficient of
tit
AdoptionD
,
* should be larger (in absolute value) as the estimate now incorporates both 
information and bonding factors. Indeed, both the magnitude and the significance level 
increase compared with the OLS estimators. The coefficients of
tit AdoptionD ,* are -0.548 and 
-1.123 in columns (5) and (6), respectively, compared to the corresponding coefficients of 
-0.174 and -0.731 in columns (3) and (4), respectively. 
Columns (7) and (8) incorporate the correction for self-selection. The coefficients of λ, 
the self-selection parameters, are -0.004 and -0.140 in columns (7) and (8) and are significant 
at the 10% and 1% level, respectively. This result suggests that the firm characteristics that 
affect brand-adoption name changes also lead to a lower cost of equity capital. Still, the 
coefficients of
tit AdoptionD ,*  are -0.117 and -0.286 in columns (7) and (8) and are 
significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.  
The main results in Table 6 are robust to a range of sensitivity analyses. First, Table 6 
is re-estimated using median regressions with bootstrapped t-statistics to correct for 
heteroskedasticity. Second, instead of a single year, it is re-estimated using three-year 
average for both independent and dependent variables. Finally, the result is qualitatively 
similar regardless of defining the dummy varaible Real as an improvement in profitability 
(ΔIFIN/ln(sales)>0) or an increase in net investments (ΔINV/ln(caps)>0). Overall, a lower 
cost of capital following a brand name adoption persists even after controlling for changes in 
the competing information sources, the endogeneity of the decision to adopt a brand name, 
and the accompanying improved economic performance. 
Table 7 addresses the issue of whether the market risk reduction and the reduction in 
size beta are induced by the brand-adoption name change. The dependent variables, β1, in 
columns (1), (3), and (5) are the differences between the post- and pre-name-change market 
risk. The dependent variables, S1, in columns (2), (4), and (6) are the differences between the 
post- and pre-name-change betas on the SMB factor. Table 7 includes the same set of 
explanatory variables as Table 6 except that the vector of economic performance is replaced 
with changes in the vector. 
Notably, for the three regressions on the market risk reduction, the adjusted R-squared 
for columns (1), (3), and (5) are relatively smaller at 4.9%, 5.1%, and 6.4%, respectively. The 
intercepts in columns (1) and (3) are significantly different from zero, suggesting that the 
market risk reduction cannot be fully explained by the set of explanatory variables. As to the 
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regressions on the reduction in size beta, the adjusted R-squared for columns (2), (4), and (6) 
are relatively larger at 9.4%, 9.9%, and 10.1%, respectively.  
Table 7 shows that the reductions in the market risk and size beta are associated with 
the brand name adoption. Columns (3) and (4) include orthogonalized residuals for the 
changes in the Performance covariates. Both the magnitude and the significance of Adoption 
increase, although marginally, compared to the OLS specifications in columns (1) and (2). 
Columns (5) and (6) add the correction for self-selection. The coefficient of λ, the 
self-selection parameter, is -2.067 in column (5) and is significant at the 5% level. However, 
the coefficient of λ is not significant in column (6). 
Taken together, the significance of Adoption is consistent with the interpretation that 
brand-adoption name changes reduce the systemic risk through the information transmission 
channel and by using brand reputation as a pledge for improved performance. 
Table 8 presents intertemporal ordered probit regressions of the four ordinal-scaled 
firm credit ratings based on Beatty, Liao, and Weber (2010). Table 8 includes almost the 
same set of explanatory variables as Table 6 except that it adds Altman’s (1968) Z-score to 
measure the default risk for public firms (e.g., Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller (2004)). The firm 
credit rating is expected to be higher for firm with higher Z-score. Columns (1) to (4) show 
the intertemporal ordered probit estimation results. Columns (5) and (6) show the results of 
the hybrid ordered probit regressions using the orthogonalized residuals for the Performance 
covariates. Columns (7) and (8) add the correction for endogenous self-selection. 
On the one hand, the brand-adoption name changes can improve firm credit ratings 
when they are responsive to new information (Odders-White and Ready (2006)). On the other 
hand, it is possible that the firm credit ratings only summarize the publicly available 
information (Wakeman (1990)) and are thus insensitive to the brand-adoption name changes. 
Column (3) shows that the coefficient of
tit AdoptionD ,* is significantly positive. 
Within the brand-adoption name change category, the ordinal-scaled credit rating is 1.13 
(coefficients of 0.01+1.12) higher after the name changes. The credit ratings of firms making 
brand-adoption name changes are significantly better at 1.26 (coefficients of 1.12+0.137) 
than firms making radical name changes, following the name changes. The finding suggests 
that brand-adoption name changes contain credit-relevant information that is not reflected in 
the credit rating prior to the name changes but has been impounded into the credit rating 
afterwards. 
Columns (5) and (6) replace Performance covariates with their orthogonalized 
residuals. Both the magnitude and the significance of 
tit AdoptionD ,* increase compared to 
the specifications in columns (3) and (4). The result is consistent with the interpretation that 
the brand reputation promises better future performances and is conducive to a higher credit 
rating. However, the credit rating is not particularly sensitive to performance improvements 
measured by the Real dummy. Columns (7) and (8) incorporate endogenous self-selection 
model. The coefficient of the self-selection parameter is 0.031 in column (7) and is 
significant at the 10% level. Still, the coefficients of 
tit AdoptionD ,*  are 0.924 and 1.048 in 
columns (7) and (8) and are significant at the 1% and 10% level, respectively. The other 
variables in the regressions have the signs suggested by previous research in almost all cases. 
Greater stock returns volatility are associated with a lower credit rating. Surprisingly, 
Altman’s (1968) Z-scores are unrelated to the credit ratings. 
To address directly how the investors in the primary bond markets perceive the 
brand-adoption name changes, Table 9 focuses on the at-issue yield spreads (Yieldspread) for 
fixed-rate nonconvertible bonds issued during the last three years before the name changes 
and the first three years after the name changes. There are 43 bond offerings prior to the name 
43
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance Volume 15, Issue 2, Winter 2011 
 
 
changes and 306 bond offerings following the name changes. Given no bond offering prior to 
the radical name changes, Table 9 focuses on the at-issue yield spreads after the name 
changes. Yieldspread is the difference between the at-issue yield for the straight debt offer 
and the yield for a Treasury bond with similar maturity on the same day. For corporate bonds 
without an exact match for Treasury maturity, a linear interpolation is used to estimate 
Treasury yields. For firms with multiple bonds, I use a weighted average of the firm’s 
individual at-issue bond credit ratings (at-issue yield spread), where the weight is the relative 
principal of the bond to the total principal outstanding. Table 9 includes a parsimonious 
version of variables in Table 8 together with variables measuring bond characteristics, bond 
risk factors, and a dummy variable that equals one for companies that issue multiple bonds. 
Columns (1) and (2) present the OLS estimation results. Column (3) replaces the four 
ordinal-scaled at-issue bond credit ratings (BR_Rating) with the residuals from the first-stage 
regression that orthogonalizes the BR_Rating to the name change dummy, Real dummy, 
Information vector, and the variables measuring bond characteristics and bond risk factors. 
Column (4) replaces the Real dummy with the residuals from the first-stage regression that 
orthogonalizes the Real dummy to the name change dummy. Column (5) replaces the 
BR_Rating and the Real dummy with their corresponding orthogonalized residuals. Columns 
(6) and (7) report results on two sensitivity analyses. Specifically, column (6) measures 
Yieldspread as the difference between the at-issue yield for the fixed-rate nonconvertible 
bond and the yield for a Treasury bond with a similar modified duration on the same day. 
Column (7) incorporates the Fama-French (1993) three risk factors: RM,t-Rf,t, SMB, and HML, 
in addition to the spreads between the Baa and Aaa index. Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann 
(2001) find that the corporate bond markets price the Fama-French three risk factors. 
Table 9 shows that all of the coefficients of Adoption are negative, ranging from 
-0.135 to -0.772. Notably, the coefficients of Adoption increase under the two-stage 
procedure, compared with the OLS estimates. A smaller at-issue yield spreads for bonds 
issued by firms with brand-adoption name changes persists even after controlling for 
observable bond characteristics and risks, observable firm characteristics, and information 
environment. The result that investors demand a smaller at-issue yield spreads in the primary 
bond markets for firms with brand-adoption name changes reinforces the idea that corporate 
names bear brand capital and are thus conducive to a lower cost of capital.  
c. A Robustness Test on the Bonding Role of the Brand-Adoption Name Changes  
The credibility of the bonding role played by the brand-adoption name changes depends on 
how large is the bond posted. In equilibrium, firms adopt brand names only when the brand 
capital is sufficiently large. Accordingly, firms will suffer significant brand reputation losses 
due to financial misrepresentation. 
Class action lawsuits are the result of financial misrepresentation. Following Karpoff, 
Lee, and Martin (2008), information on coverage on class action lawsuits during the first 
three years following the name changes and for payments to shareholders to settle them is 
gathered from the Lexis-Nexis database (company news file, SECREL on Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) decisions, orders, and releases, and CASES on Securities 
Exchange Commission cases and releases). 
Table 10 shows that there are 34 (4.9% of the brand sample) class action lawsuits 
against the firms with brand-adoption name changes and 5 (2.6% of the radical sample) 
against the firms with radical name changes. To the extent that the Lexis-Nexis chooses to 
report on firms that are better recognized, this under-reporting bias on firms with radical 
name changes might lead to the underestimated frequencies of corporate misconduct. 
How much of the stock market decline is due to the loss in brand reputation as a result 
of the announcement of class action lawsuits?  
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The stock market decline settlement of class action lawsuit + loss if no cooking the 
books +reputation loss (10) 
According to Eq. (10), firms suffer direct out-of pocket costs to settle and resolve 
class action lawsuits. Furthermore, it takes into consideration the stock price had there been 
no financial misreporting. The loss if there is no misrepresentation is calculated by 
multiplying each firm’s book value of write-offs by its industry median market-to-book assets 
ratio using two-digit SIC codes. The book value of write-offs is the largest accounting 
adjustment and is defined as (negative one times) the sum of special items, accounting 
charges, and charge offs (Items 17, 183, and 349) after the name changes. Table 10 uses 
market model regressions to estimate the abnormal returns due to the announcement of class 
action lawsuits and transforms the abnormal returns into dollar terms by multiplying each 
abnormal return by the firm’s market capitalization one day prior to the announcement date. 
The estimation window is (-260, -11), with day 0 being the announcement of the class action 
lawsuit. Table 10 partitions the total dollar loss into three portions according to Eq. (10). 
There are 3 firms with settlements funded entirely by insurance policies, 7 firms for which 
the court announces dismissal of the class action lawsuits, and 22 firms without information 
on the class action settlement payments. Table 10 then partitions the total dollar loss for these 
32 firms into two portions: those attributable to the losses if there is no misrepresentation and 
to reputation loss. 
Panel A reports the estimated loss during the announcement period of (-3, 0). A 
considerable portion of the stock market loss is due to unanticipated poor performance. For 
example, for brand-adoption name change firms, around 90 (70) % of the mean (median) 
cumulative CAR (-3, 0) loss is due to the loss if there is no misrepresentation. The mean 
(median) reputation losses differ significantly between firms making brand-adoption name 
changes and firms making radical name changes. The mean (median) magnitude of the 
estimated reputation loss is almost $87.5 ($16.3) million for the brand-adoption name change 
firms, while the estimated mean (median) magnitude of the estimated reputation loss is $16.3 
($6.4) for the radical name change firms. The finding of significant reputation losses from 
corporate misconduct is consistent with Klein and Leffler (1981), who argue that a loss to 
brand capital occurs when the brand is misused. 
Panel B shows that the mean magnitudes of the estimated reputation loss based on the 
cumulative CAR (-2, 2) are $63.7 million and $4.3 million for the brand adoption and the 
radical name change firms, respectively. The mean (median) magnitude of the estimated 
reputation loss for the brand-adoption name change firms is $63.7 ($12.4) million and is 
comparable to that reported by Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008); their mean (median) 
estimated reputation loss is $64.7 million ($19.8 million). 
The estimated impact of corporate misconduct on reputation loss is robust to an 
alternative estimation. Reestimating the reputation loss by using the largest accounting 
adjustments during the 60 months following the Class period (typically the time frame during 
which the alleged fraud is believed to take place) as the book value of write-offs, the 
unreported result shows that the mean (median) reputation loss is $810 million ($20.5) for the 
brand-adoption name change firms and $51.8 million ($6.9 million) for the radical name 
change firms. The mean (median) reputation losses differ significantly between brand 
adoption firms and radical change firms at a p-value of 0.056 (0.086). 
 
  
5. Conclusions 
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This paper proposes that brand-adoption name changes play a valuable information role. 
Elevating a well-recognized brand name to the corporate level reduces information 
asymmetry. In addition, brand-adoption name changes play a valuable bonding role by 
associating the brand reputation with the firm’s prospects. As a result, the types of name 
changes bear implications on the accompanying economic outcomes. This paper documents 
that a majority of the brand-adoption name changes are accompanied by a significant increase 
in net investments and an improvement in profitability, while a majority of the radical name 
changes are cosmetic in nature without real improvements. 
This paper documents that a brand name adoption is associated with a lower cost of 
capital following the name change, while there are no intertemporal variations in the cost of 
capital for radical name change. This finding persists even after controlling for the competing 
information sources, the accompanying changes in firm characteristics, and the endogeneity 
of the decision to adopt a brand name as the new corporate name. The finding supports the 
idea that corporate name bears brand capital and is thus conducive to a lower cost of capital. 
The bonding role of brand-adoption name changes is further buttressed by that the brand 
reputation suffers for financial misrepresentation.  
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Table 1 
List of Variables 
 
Variables Definitions 
 Cost of Capital RIVOJMPEGPEGPE rrrrr  , , , ,
, CR_Rating, BR_Rating, Yieldspread PEr , Easton (2004) 1 0 1/ P , 0PEr EPS EPS 
 
PEGr , Easton (2004) 2 1 0 2 1( - ) / ,PEGr EPS EPS P EPS EPS 
 MPEGr , Easton (2004) 
2 1 1 0 2 1( - ) / P ),MPEG MPEGr EPS r DPS EPS EPS EPS  
 OJr , Gode and 
Mohanram (2003) 
2
1 0 2
2 1
2
1
1
f f
0
( / P ) * ( ( 1)
EPS EPS
, ,
EPS
1
(( 1) ), 1 r -3%, where r  is the yield on 10-year notes.
2 P
OJr A A EPS growth
A
growth
DPS

 
   


 
   
 
RIVr , Gebhardt, Lee 
and Swaminathan 
(2001) 
11
0 1 0 12 11
0 0 11
1
0 0 1 0 0 1
[( ) ] [( ) ]
,
(1 ) (1 )
[( ] / ( ), ( ) ( ) ,
*current payout ratio, for i 2
i RIV i RIV
i
i RIV RIV RIV
i i i i i i i
i i
E ROE r B E ROE r B
P B
r r r
E ROE EPS E B E B E B EPS DPS
DPS EPS


 
 
  
 
   
 

 
CR_Rating Firm’s categorical credit rating. One if the firm’s credit rating is between SD (D) and 
B+, two if the bond rating is between BB- and BB+, three if the rating is between 
BBB- and BBB+, and four if the rating is between A- and AAA. 
BR_Rating The at-issue bond’s categorical credit rating. For firms with multiple bonds, I use a 
weighted average of a firm’s individual at-issue bond categorical ratings, where the 
weight is the relative principal outstanding.  
Yieldspread The difference between the at-issue yield for the fixed-rate nonconvertible bond offers 
and the yield for a Treasury bond with a similar maturity on the same day. For 
corporate bonds that do not exactly match the Treasury maturity, I use linear 
interpolation to estimate the Treasury yields.  
Economic Nature 
of Name Change 
Tobin’s Q, IFIN, EFIN, INV, Real    
Tobin’s Q Market value of the assets/book value of the assets (# 6 – #60 +#199*#25) /(#6) 
IFIN Internal financing. For firms reporting format codes 1, 2 and 3, it equals #123 + #124 
+ #125 + #126 + #106 + #213 + #217 + #218. For firms reporting format code 7, it 
equals #123 + #124 + #125 + #126 + #106 + #213 + #217 + #314.  
EFIN External financing that equals net equity financing plus net debt financing. Net equity 
financing equals the issuance of common and preferred stock (#108) less the purchase 
of common and preferred stock (#115) less payments for dividends (#127). Net debt 
financing equals the issuance of long-term debt (#111) less payments for long-term 
debt reductions (#114) less the net changes in current debt (#301).  
INV The aggregate net investments. For firms reporting format codes 1 to 3, net 
investments are equal to #128 + #113 + #129 + #219 - #107 - #109. For format code 
7, net investments are equal to #128 + #113 + #129 - #107 - #109 - #309 - #310.  
Real One for firms with improvements in IFIN or INV, and zero otherwise.  
Information 
Environment 
Analysts, Turnover, Institution, Leverage, Bankdebt      
Analysts Number of equity analysts 
Turnover Trading volume/the average of outstanding shares 
Institution Institutional ownership 
Leverage Ratio of debt over total assets 
Bankdebt One for firms with notes payable or bank debt (#206), and zero otherwise. 
Accounting-based 
Intangible Assets 
ADV, R&D, Goodwill 
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ADV Advertising expenses/total operating expenses  
R&D R&D expense/total operating expenses 
Goodwill Balance sheet intangibles. Goodwill=(#204 +#33)/total assets 
 
Table II 
Changes in Firm Characteristics around Brand-Adoption Name Changes and Radical Name Changes 
 
 Brand Adoption Radical Change Brand Adoption vs. 
Radical Change 
Before  After p-paired    Before  After p-paired    p-before    p-after   
Panel A: Economic nature of name change 
Tobin’s Q 1.797 1.960 [0.042] 1.630 1.539 [0.470] [0.134] [0.000] 
53.8% [0.081] 45.98% [0.804]   
(446) (554)  (142) (111)    
IFIN/ln(sales) 5.289 8.988 [0.001] 4.890 5.320   [0.809] [0.768] [0.020] 
63.3% [0.000] 48.2% [0.670]   
(548) (491)  (139) (106)    
EFIN/ln(cap)  0.984 1.150 [0.786] 2.508 -3.010 [0.015] [0.071] [0.057] 
46.4% [0.929] 43.5% [0.904]   
(532) (476)  (140) (106)    
INV/ln(cap) 4.843 6.458 [0.032] -1.744 -10.420 [0.033] [0.000] [0.000] 
55.4% [0.022] 48.2% [0.670]   
(519) (462)  (137) (106)    
Panel B: Information environment 
Analysts 0.258 5.420 [0.000] 0.083 2.404 [0.000] [0.114] [0.000] 
85.2% [0.000] 76.9% [0.000]   
(697) [697)  (193) (193)    
Turnover 0.115 0.123 [0.325] 0.128 0.109 [0.525] [0.587] [0.487] 
52.3% [0.125] 47.0% [0.812]   
(681) [692)  (185) (190)    
Institution 24.66 26.36 [0.416] 19.620 17.100 [0.562] [0.149] [0.006] 
56.5% [0.019] 46.2% [0.756]   
(276) [287)  (54) (58)    
Leverage 0.258 0.283  [0.076] 0.284 0.333 [0.129] [0.244] [0.065] 
51.7% [0.206] 54.0% [0.185]   
(629)  (649)  (164) (163)    
Bankdebt 51.3% 41.0% [0.000] 49.2% 41.5% [0.124] [0.599] [0.917] 
41.0% [0.000] 41.5% [0.021]   
(697) (697)  (193) (193)    
Panel C: Accounting-based intangible assets 
ADV 0.131 0.133 [0.357] 0.067 0.061 [0.962] [0.010] [0.029] 
44.0% [0.918] 42.9% [0.788]   
(203) (184)  (49) (27)    
R&D 0.146 0.154 [0.607] 0.133 0.157 [0.488] [0.603] [0.916] 
40.0% [0.996] 29.2% [0.989]   
(259) (226)  (52) (38)    
Goodwill 0.091 0.155 [0.000] 0.084 0.097 [0.611] [0.185] [0.022] 
58.1% [0.001] 44.3% [0.880]   
(561) (498)  (143) (108)    
 
The first line in each cell is the mean (and the p-value of a matched pair of t-tests to compare the matched 
paired means), the second line in each cell is the percentage of the variable with at least zero increase (and 
51
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance Volume 15, Issue 2, Winter 2011 
 
the p-value of a binomial sign test to determine if the percentage is significantly greater than 50%), 
the third line in each cell is the number of observations. For Bankdebt, the first line is the percentage 
of firms with notes payable or bank debt, the second line is the percentage of firms with at least 
zero increase in Bankdebt, and the third line in each cell is the number of observations. The last two 
columns show the p-values for differences in means between the brand-adoption name changes and the 
radical name changes.          
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Table V 
Probit Analysis for the Choices between the Brand Adoption Name Changes and the Radical 
Name Changes 
 
 Brand Adoption vs. Radical Change 
Intercept 2.740 
(0.000) 
Tobin’s Q 0.019 
(0.081) 
IFIN/ln(caps) 0.013 
(0.008) 
EFIN/ln(caps) -0.023 
(0.154) 
INV/ln(caps) 0.055 
(0.004) 
Bad coverage  -0.022 
(0.009) 
Other coverage 0.006 
(0.062) 
Ticker -0.012 
(0.950) 
Brands 0.033 
(0.021) 
Goodwill 0.150 
(0.758) 
Physical capital 0.008 
(0.096) 
ln(1+Age Since IPO) 0.088 
(0.584) 
Bid/Ask Spread -0.042 
(0.016) 
ln(1+Analysts) 3.937 
(0.089) 
Institution 0.019 
(0.000) 
Herfindahl 0.361 
(0.638) 
Leverage -0.486 
(0.020) 
Year fixed effect Yes 
Correct Prediction Rate (%) (CPR) 89.35 
pseudo R
2 
18.09 
Sample Size 684 
 
For the dependent variable, Brand-adoption name change equals one, and zero otherwise. Bad coverage refers to 
the number of news reports on fraud, unreliable acts, and poor performance in the company news file of the Lexis-
Nexis database and the Dow Jones Interactive database within three years prior to name changes. Other coverage 
refers to the number of media reports other than bad news in the same above sources over the same period. Ticker 
equals one for firms that experience ticker symbol changes. Brands refer to the number of reported brand names. 
Physical capital is the natural log of net property, plant & equipment. Age since IPO is the number of years 
between IPO and the announcement of the name changes. Bid/Ask Spread is 100*(1-bid/ask). Herfindahl is the 
Herfindahl index. Please refer to Table 1 for the detailed definition of the rest of the independent variables. P-
values (in parentheses) are based on White-corrected standard errors. The p-value for the significance of the 
regression equation is less than 0.000. 
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Table VI 
Intertemporal Regression Analysis of the Effect of the Brand-Adoption Name Changes on the Costs 
of Equity Capital 
 
 Expected  
Sign 
OLS regression Orthogonalized 
reg. 
Self-selection 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept  1.338 2.720 0.546 2.058 0.064 0.627 5.451 6.790 
(0.502
) 
(0.957
) 
(0.899
) 
(0.58
1) 
(0.988
) 
(0.860
) 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Type of name change and the correction for self-selection  
Dt (0,1) - -0.758 -0.844 -1.182 -
1.685 
-1.185 -2.260 -0.009 -0.089 
(0.300
) 
(0.407
) 
(0.380
) 
(0.48
0) 
(0.347
) 
(0.284
) 
(0.900) (0.444) 
Adoption (0,1) -   -0.894 -
0.521 
-1.094 -0.724 -0.129 -0.082 
  (0.049
) 
(0.12
7) 
(0.020
) 
(0.102
) 
(0.086) (0.107) 
Lambda -       -0.004 -0.140 
      (0.085) (0.000) 
Dt *Adoption -   -0.174 -
0.731 
-0.548 -1.123 -0.117 -0.286 
  (0.097
) 
(0.08
5) 
(0.010
) 
(0.034
) 
(0.089) (0.037) 
Economic performance (Nature of name change) 
Tobin’s Q - -0.153 -0.001 -0.129 -
0.010 
-0.100 -0.009 -0.017 -0.010 
(0.116
) 
(0.198
) 
(0.147
) 
(0.24
3) 
(0.909
) 
(0.983
) 
(0.623) (0.686) 
IFIN/ln(sales) - - 
0.009 
-0.006 -0.007 -
0.007 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.048 -0.023 
(0.079
) 
(0.082
) 
(0.085
) 
(0.09
8) 
(0.936
) 
(0.836
) 
(0.067) (0.079) 
EFIN/ln(caps) + 0.004 0.013 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.204 0.261 
(0.817
) 
(0.450
) 
(0.527
) 
(0.45
0) 
(0.989
) 
(0.828
) 
(0.079) (0.062) 
INV/ln(caps) + -0.010 -0.016 -0.020 -
0.023 
-0.008 -0.002 -0.020 -0.021 
(0.096
) 
(0.085
) 
(0.049
) 
(0.08
7) 
(0.561
) 
(0.344
) 
(0.223) (0.205) 
Real (0,1) -  -2.108  -
3.313 
 -1.126  -1.931 
 (0.014
) 
 (0.07
2) 
 (0.099
) 
 (0.052) 
Dt *Real -  -1.458  -
1.658 
 -0.654  -1.102 
 (0.059
) 
 (0.06
6) 
 (0.466
) 
 (0.082) 
Information environment 
ln(1+Analysts) - -1.349 -1.169 -1.524 -
1.345 
-1.524 -1.345 -1.080 -1.076 
(0.048
) 
(0.012
) 
(0.049
) 
(0.03
4) 
(0.049
) 
(0.034
) 
(0.002) (0.032) 
Turnover - -4.644 -8.843 -4.618 - -4.618 -9.028 -0.287 -0.307 
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9.028 
(0.073
) 
(0.006
) 
(0.031
) 
(0.08
2) 
(0.031
) 
(0.082
) 
(0.040) (0.039) 
Institution - -0.024 -0.014 -0.026 -
0.007 
-0.026 -0.007 -0.061 -0.048 
(0.269
) 
(0.354
) 
(0.283
) 
(0.57
9) 
(0.283
) 
(0.579
) 
(0.101) (0.209) 
Leverage + 7.886 8.881 6.979 7.025 6.979 7.025 0.287 0.154 
(0.010
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.012
) 
(0.01
4) 
(0.012
) 
(0.014
) 
(0.076) (0.088) 
Bankdebt (0,1) - 0.586 0.397 0.530 0.516 0.530 0.516 0.483 0.031 
(0.609
) 
(0.623
) 
(0.681
) 
(0.63
2) 
(0.681
) 
(0.632
) 
(0.312) (0.953) 
CR (0,1) - -1.308 -1.272 -1.203 -
0.630 
-1.203 -0.630 -1.176 -0.723 
(0.053
) 
(0.056
) 
(0.051
) 
(0.68
1) 
(0.051
) 
(0.681
) 
(0.057) (0.274) 
Other controls: Accounting-based intangible assets, volatility and price momentum  
Goodwill - -0.298 -0.609 -7.110 -
0.987 
-7.110 -0.987 -0.017 -0.017 
(0.902
) 
(0.726
) 
(0.192
) 
(0.67
6) 
(0.192
) 
(0.676
) 
(0.623) (0.613) 
STD + 43.43
3 
28.93
2 
27.746 27.186 27.746 27.186 9.951 4.304 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) 
MAE of forecast 
earnings 
+ 0.079 0.066 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.012 0.015 
(0.028
) 
(0.095
) 
(0.097) (0.079) (0.097) (0.079) (0.000) (0.034) 
Return-12 + -3.660 -3.482 -3.484 -3.441 -3.484 -3.441 -1.219 -1.193 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No.  550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 
Adj. R-squared (%)  58.14 61.04 59.77 65.21 58.38 65.21 62.81 66.65  
Dependent variable (rMPEG -rf,t) is measured at the year-end prior to and at the end of the third year following the 
name changes. Dt equals to one for the post-name-change period, and zero otherwise. Adoption equals one for the 
brand adoption name changes, and zero otherwise. The other independent variables are measured at two years 
prior to and two years following the name changes. Real equals one for firms with an improvement in 
IFIN/ln(sales) and zero otherwise. CR equals one for firms whose bonds have been rated during the sample 
period and zero otherwise. STD is the standard deviation of monthly buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns from 
the previous five years ending at the time measuring independent variable. MAE of forecast earnings is the mean 
absolute error of the preceding five annual I/B/E/S consensus forecasts ending at the time measuring independent 
variable. Return-12 is the one year period buy-and-hold market-adjusted return. Please refer to Table 1 for the 
detailed definition of the rest of the independent variables. P-values (in parentheses) are based on White-
corrected standard errors. For all regressions, the P-value for the significance of the regression equation is 0.000 
or lower. 
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Table VII 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Effect of the Brand-Adoption Name Changes on the Reduction in 
Market Risk and the Reduction in Size Beta 
 
 Expected  
Sign 
OLS Orthogonalized Self-selection 
β1 S1 β1 S1 β1 S1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept  1.024 1.213 1.009 1.160 0.666 0.927 
(0.035) (0.029) (0.038) (0.037) (0.363) (0.241) 
Type of name change and the correction for self-selection 
Adoption (0,1) - -0.764 -0.204 -0.775 -0.211 -0.521 -0.195 
(0.053) (0.066) (0.042) (0.065) (0.075) (0.075) 
Lambda -     -2.067 -0.278 
    (0.013) (0.895) 
Changes in economic performance (Nature of name change) 
ΔTobin’s Q - -0.061 -0.048 -0.077 0.061 -0.056 -0.020 
(0.026) (0.084) (0.426) (0.584) (0.096) (0.188) 
ΔIFIN/ln(sales) - -0.001 -0.015 -0.008 -0.195 -0.002 -0.020 
(0.945) (0.021) (0.945) (0.121) (0.807) (0.067) 
ΔEFIN/ln(caps) + 0.003 -0.001 0.046 -0.021 0.002 0.003 
(0.734) (0.893) (0.814) (0.893) (0.826) (0.746) 
ΔINV/ln(caps) + 0.007 0.007 0.149 0.138 0.006 0.006 
(0.285) (0.387) (0.285) (0.387) (0.401) (0.452) 
Information environment 
ln(1+Analysts) - -0.207 -0.341 -0.207 -0.341 -0.206 -0.308 
(0.488) (0.019) (0.488) (0.019) (0.549) (0.046) 
Turnover - -3.262 0.561 -3.261 0.561 -4.036 -0.265 
(0.000) (0.630) (0.000) (0.630) (0.001) (0.836) 
Institution - 0.002 -0.007 0.002 -0.007 0.003 -0.001 
(0.711) (0.287) (0.711) (0.287) (0.616) (0.843) 
Leverage + 0.274 0.557 0.274 0.557 0.609 0.811 
(0.069) (0.031) (0.069) (0.031) (0.062) (0.023) 
Bankdebt (0,1) - 0.041 -0.192 0.041 -0.192 0.028 -0.207 
(0.856) (0.451) (0.856) (0.451) (0.915) (0.458) 
CR (0,1) - -0.165 -0.363 -0.165 -0.363 -0.128 -0.396 
(0.596) (0.310) (0.596) (0.310) (0.730) (0.321) 
Other controls: Accounting-based intangible assets, volatility and price momentum  
Goodwill - -0.472 0.199 -0.472 0.199 -0.486 -0.710 
(0.169) (0.789) (0.169) (0.789) (0.537) (0.403) 
STD + 0.884 -5.797 0.884 -5.797 1.370 -4.734 
(0.388) (0.000) (0.388) (0.000) (0.071) (0.000) 
MAE of forecast 
earnings 
+ 0.124 0.087 0.124 0.087 0.144 0.067 
(0.711) (0.631) (0.711) (0.631) (0.624) (0.823) 
Return-12 + 0.098 0.320 0.098 0.320 0.088 0.298 
(0.159) (0.035) (0.159) (0.035) (0.543) (0.056) 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No.  351 351 351 351 292 292 
Adj. R-squared (%)  4.90 9.40 5.10 9.92 6.40 10.12 
 The dependent variable, β1, in columns (1), (3), and (5) is the differences between the post- and pre-name 
change betas on the market factor. The dependent variable, S1, in columns (2), (4), and (6) is the differences 
between the post- and pre-name change betas on the SMB factor. Adoption equals one for the brand adoption 
name change firms, and zero otherwise. I measure the changes in economic performances as the differences 
between the two years following and two years prior to the name changes. I measure the other independent 
variables at two years prior to the name changes. CR equals one for firms whose bonds have been rated 
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 during our sample period and zero otherwise. STD is the standard deviation of monthly buy-and-hold market-
adjusted returns from the previous five years ending at the time measuring independent variable. MAE of 
forecast earnings is the mean absolute error of the preceding five annual I/B/E/S consensus forecasts ending 
at the time measuring independent variable. Return-12 is the one year period buy-and-hold market-adjusted 
return. Please refer to Table 1 for the detailed definition of the rest of the independent variables. P-values (in 
parentheses) are based on White-corrected standard errors. For all regressions, the P-value for the 
significance of the regression equation is 0.000 or lower.  
 Table VIII 
Intertemporal Ordered Probit Regression Analysis of the Effect of the Brand-Adoption Name 
Changes on the Firm Credit Ratings 
 Expected 
Sign 
Ordered Probit reg. Orthogonalize
d reg. 
Self-selection 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Type of name change and the correction for self-selection 
Dt (0,1) + 1.073 1.359 0.010 0.314 0.010 0.150 0.029 0.151 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.988
) 
(0.657
) 
(0.988
) 
(0.831
) 
(0.976
) 
(0.882) 
Adoption (0,1) +   0.137 0.069 0.137 0.069 0.196 0.164 
  (0.032
) 
(0.894
) 
(0.032
) 
(0.894
) 
(0.814
) 
(0.833) 
Lambda +       0.031 0.084 
      (0.071
) 
(0.101) 
Dt *Adoption +   1.120 1.170 1.340 1.352 0.924 1.048 
  (0.053
) 
(0.116
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.006
) 
(0.078) 
Economic performance (Nature of name change) 
Tobin’s Q + 0.285 0.285 0.289 0.276 0.101 0.028 0.118 0.139 
(0.096
) 
(0.100
) 
(0.098
) 
(0.121
) 
(0.198
) 
(0.241
) 
(0.155
) 
(0.123) 
IFIN/ln(sales) + 0.005 0.005 0.037 0.043 0.004 0.008 0.044 0.048 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.771
) 
(0.176
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.000) 
EFIN/ln(caps) - -0.068 0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.002 
(0.578
) 
(0.240
) 
(0.669
) 
(0.542
) 
(0.979
) 
(0.794
) 
(0.216
) 
(0.198) 
INV/ln(caps) + 0.263 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.006 
(0.072
) 
(0.527
) 
(0.541
) 
(0.840
) 
(0.774
) 
(0.981
) 
(0.571
) 
(0.326) 
Real +  0.033  0.356  0.268  0.167 
 (0.073
) 
 (0.147
) 
 (0.331
) 
 (0.240) 
Dt *Real +  0.275  0.401  0.073  0.662 
 (0.089
) 
 (0.078
) 
 (0.196
) 
 (0.140) 
Information environment 
Analysts + 0.016 0.020 0.016 0.022 0.016 0.022 0.106 0.165 
(0.041
) 
(0.010
) 
(0.034
) 
(0.006
) 
(0.034
) 
(0.006
) 
(0.001
) 
(0.058) 
Turnover + 0.123 0.050 0.002 0.260 0.002 0.260 1.329 0.190 
(0.094
) 
(0.195
) 
(0.486
) 
(0.876
) 
(0.486
) 
(0.876
) 
(0.754
) 
(0.632) 
Institution + 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 
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The dependant variable takes the value of four when the bond is rated between A- and AAA, three 
when it is rated between BBB- and BBB+, two when it is rated between BB- and BB+, and one for 
the rest. The dependent variable is measured at the year-end prior to and at the end of the third year 
following the name changes. Dt equals to one for the post-name change period, and zero otherwise. 
Adoption equals one for the brand-adoption name changes, and zero otherwise. The other independent 
variables are measured at two years prior to and following the name changes. Real dummy equals one for 
firms with an improvement in IFIN/ln(sales), and zero otherwise. Bankdebt equals one for firms that have 
notes payable or bank debt (#206), and zero otherwise. STD is the standard deviation of monthly 
buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns from the previous five years ending at the time measuring 
independent variable. Z-score is the Altman’s (1968) Z-score for public firms. Please refer to Table 1 for 
the detailed definitions of the rest of the independent variables. P-values (in parentheses) are based on 
White-corrected standard errors. For all regressions, the P-value for the significance of the regression 
equation is 0.000 or lower.  
  
(0.095
) 
(0.042
) 
(0.064
) 
(0.090
) 
(0.064
) 
(0.090
) 
(0.084
) 
(0.146) 
Leverage - -1.509 -1.500 -1.498 -1.515 -1.498 -1.515 -2.209 -2.259 
(0.004
) 
(0.004
) 
(0.004
) 
(0.004
) 
(0.004
) 
(0.004
) 
(0.026
) 
(0.000) 
Bankdebt (0,1) + 0.328 0.349 0.388 0.422 0.388 0.422 0.829 0.820 
(0.089
) 
(0.073
) 
(0.045
) 
(0.032
) 
(0.045
) 
(0.032
) 
(0.019
) 
(0.020) 
Other controls: Accounting-based intangible assets, volatility and risk 
Goodwill - -0.421 -0.297 -0.489 -0.333 -0.489 -0.333 -0.875 -0.819 
(0.328
) 
(0.496
) 
(0.262
) 
(0.453
) 
(0.262
) 
(0.453
) 
(0.119
) 
(0.214) 
STD - -
11.21
8 
-
11.87
0 
-10.491
 
-10.995
 
-10.491
 
-10.995
 
-5.487 -9.564 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.000
) 
(0.000) 
Z-score  + -0.003 0.020 0.011 0.042 0.011 0.042 -0.030 0.039 
(0.964
) 
(0.760
) 
(0.870) (0.531) (0.870) (0.531) (0.673) (0.720) 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No.  699 699 699 699 699 699 699 699 
Pseudo R-squared 
(%) 
 44.45 40.54 48.66 48.53 54.66 59.76 51.88 58.94 
Cut-off group 1  -0.955 -1.097 -0.943 -0.881 -1.640 -1.444 -0.927 -0.888 
Cut-off group 2  -0.015 -0.123 0.019 0.126 -0.678 -0.437 0.947 1.004 
Cut-off group 3  1.647 1.588 1.719 1.892 1.215 1.330 3.223 3.315 
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Table IX 
Regression Analysis of the Effect of the Brand-Adoption Name Changes on the At-Issue Yield Spreads 
 
 Expecte
d 
Sign 
OLS  Orth. 
BR_Rating  
Orth. Real Orth. BR_Rating and Real 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant  3.000 2.819 2.819 2.829 2.636 2.496 3.512 
(0.008) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.240) (0.000) 
Type of name change 
Adoption (0,1) -  -0.135 -0.195 -0.142 -0.325 -0.526 -0.772 
 (0.073) (0.062) (0.071) (0.041) (0.046) (0.000) 
Economic performance (Nature of name change) 
Real - -0.373 -0.337 -0.656 0.033 -0.656 -0.160 -0.123 
(0.067) (0.086) (0.035) (0.901) (0.035) (0.799) (0.000) 
Information environment 
Turnover - -3.152 -2.063 -4.491 -2.063 -4.491 -3.178 -5.610 
(0.037) (0.064) (0.017) (0.064) (0.017) (0.066) (0.070) 
Institution - 0.000 -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.008 -0.004 -0.017 
(0.938) (0.719) (0.075) (0.719) (0.075) (0.593) (0.014) 
Leverage + 3.062 3.207 3.416 3.207 3.416 2.989 2.212 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bankdebt (0,1) - -0.642 -0.908 -1.055 -0.908 -1.055 -0.916 -0.939 
(0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.056) (0.000) 
Bond characteristics 
BR_Rating - -0.609 -0.414 -0.414 -0.414 -0.414 -0.329 -0.566 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.206) (0.000) 
Principal + 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(0.039) (0.147) (0.411) (0.147) (0.411) (0.662) (0.578) 
Maturity + 0.096 0.095 0.140 0.095 0.140 0.209 0.195 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.004) (0.045) 
Call + 0.681 0.709 0.463 0.709 0.463 0.347 0.411 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.081) (0.009) (0.081) (0.098) (0.000) 
Sub + 0.081 0.101 1.346 0.101 1.346 0.951 1.358 
(0.782) (0.153) (0.000) (0.153) (0.000) (0.161) (0.000) 
Put - -0.037 -0.074 -0.524 -0.074 -0.524 -0.430 -1.246 
(0.915) (0.749) (0.130) (0.749) (0.130) (0.521) (0..138) 
Placement + 0.073 0.096 0.730 0.096 0.730 0.514 0.852 
(0.072) (0.096) (0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000) 
Volatility and risk 
STD + 4.310 4.174 4.862 4.174 4.862 8.565 7.131 
(0.421) (0.018) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025) (0.010) (0.041) 
Z-score - -0.039 -0.084 -0.125 -0.084 -0.125 -0.148 -0.153 
(0.636) (0.270) (0.121) (0.270) (0.121) (0.355) (0.131) 
Baa-Aaa spread + 0.691 1.215 0.051 1.215 0.051 0.783 0.271 
(0.093) (0.084) (0.096) (0.084) (0.096) (0.066) (0.223) 
RM,t-Rf,t +       0.003 
      (0.784) 
SMB +       0.277 
      (0.000) 
HML +       0.037 
      (0.001) 
No.  254 254 254 254 254 254 254 
Pseudo R-squared 
(%) 
 47.97 48.82 48.82 48.82 48.82 47.63 51.35 
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The dependant variable is the at-issue yield spreads. The bond issuances are measured during the first three years 
after the name changes. Adoption equals one for the brand adoption name changes, and zero otherwise. Real equals 
one for firms with an improvement in IFIN/ln(sales), and zero otherwise. Bankdebt equals one for firms with notes 
payable or bank debt (#206), and zero otherwise. BR_Rating is the at-issue four ordinal-scaled bond rating. Bond 
characteristics include principal (the ratio of the principal amount of the bond over the firm’s total assets), maturity 
(natural logarithm of one plus the number of years to final maturity), call (an indicator equals one for callable bonds 
and zero otherwise), sub (an indicator equals one for subordinated bonds and zero otherwise), put (an indicator 
equals one for bonds containing put options and zero otherwise), and placement (a categorical variable equals two 
for traditional private placement debt, one for 144A private placement debt, and zero for public offering bond). STD 
is the standard deviation of monthly buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns from the previous five years ending at the 
time measuring the independent variable. Z-score is the Altman’s (1968) Z-score for public firms. Baa-Aaa spread is 
the difference of yield spread between Moody’s Baa bonds and Aaa bonds. Please refer to Table 1 for the detailed 
definitions of the rest of independent variables. Model (6) measures the yield spreads as the difference between the 
at-issue yield for the fixed-rate nonconvertible bond offers and the yield for a Treasury bond with a similar modified 
duration on the same day. All models include a dummy that equals one for companies that issue multiple bonds in 
the sample
.
 P-values (in parentheses) are based on White-corrected standard errors. For all regressions, the P-value 
for the significance of the regression equation is 0.000 or lower. 
 
Table X 
Estimated Brand Reputation Loss from Financial Misconduct 
 
 Brand Adoption Radical Change 
 
Brand Adoption  
vs.  
Radical Change 
Mean Median Mean Median [P-value] 
Panel A: Reputation loss based on CAR (-3,0)  
Cumulative CAR (-3,0)% 
abnormal returns, 
 
-16.68% -9.27% -11.240 -12.27 [0.092] [0.905] 
[0.000] [0.048] [0.115] [0.625]   
(34) (34) (5) (5)   
(1) Cumulative CAR (-3,0)% loss 
($ millions) 
948.790 37.83 60.111 9.209 [0.096] [0.389] 
[0.065] [0.003] (0.181) (0.375)   
(34) (34) (5) (5)   
(2) Loss if no cooking of the 
books 
($ millions)=(3)*(4) 
857.257  26.56 43.842 27.34 [0.066] [0.660] 
[0.041] [0.000] [0.148] [0.063]   
(34) (34) (5) (5)   
 (3) Book value of write-offs 571.437  18.94 29.296 21.25 [0.064] [0.721] 
[0.039] [0.000] [0.156] [0.063]   
(34) (34) (5) (5)   
 (4) Industry median market-to-
book assets 
1.429 1.372 1.470 1.451 [0.777] [0.644] 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.063]   
(34) (34) (5) (5)   
(5) Settlement payments of class 
action lawsuit ($ millions) 
19.707 5.00 — — — — 
[0.240] [0.016]     
(7) (7) (0) (0)   
Reputation Loss ($ Millions) 
=(1)-(2)-(5) 
87.476 16.270 16.270 6.389 [0.064] [0.093] 
[0.023] [0.090] [0.190] [1.000]   
(34) (34) (5) (5)   
Panel B: Reputation loss based on CAR (-2,2)  
Cumulative CAR (-2,2)% 
abnormal returns, 
 
-15.41% -11.70% -12.81% -8.083% [0.075] [0.794] 
[0.000] [0.024] [0.154] [0.125]   
(34) (34) (5) (5)   
(1)
* 
Cumulative CAR (-2,2)% loss  
($ millions) 
797.590 19.352 16.495 17.19 [0.039] [0.887] 
[0.099] [0.024] [0.089] [0.125]   
(34) (34) (5) (5)   
Reputation Loss ($ Millions) 63.724 12.42 4.258 8.890 [0.066] [0.476] 
62
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance Volume 15, Issue 2, Winter 2011 
 
 
=(1)
*
-(2)-(5) [0.069] [0.073] [0.625] [0.855]   
(34) (34) (5) (5)   
 
I search for the Lexis-Nexis database (company news file, SECREL, and CASES) for coverage on class 
action lawsuits for three years following the name changes and for payments to shareholders to settle the 
class action lawsuits. Class action lawsuits are shareholder lawsuits against the firm, officers, directors and 
other related parties, as a result of the financial reporting related charges. I calculate CAR(%) using a market 
model regression of firm stock returns on the CRSP equally weighted market index. The estimation window 
is (-260, -11), with day 0 being the announcement of the class action lawsuit. To transform the abnormal 
returns into dollar terms, I multiply each abnormal return by the firm’s market capitalization one day before 
the event day. The cumulative CAR (-3,0)% loss is the dollar losses summed over all event days for a given 
firm. I calculate the loss if there is no misrepresentation by multiplying each firm’s book value of write-offs 
by its industry median market-to-book assets ratio using two-digit SIC codes. The book value of write-offs is 
the largest accounting adjustment and is defined as (negative one times) the sum of special items, accounting 
charges, and charge offs (Items 17, 183, and 349) after the name changes. If the settlement consists of 
common stock of the defendant, the payment is valued at the settlement announcement date. There are 22 
firms without information on the settlement payments, 3 firms in which the settlement is funded entirely by 
insurance policies, and 7 firms for which the court announces dismissal of the class action lawsuit. P-values 
in square brackets are for the two-tailed t-test (two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test) that the mean (median) 
is equal to zero. The last two columns show the p-values for differences in means (medians) between the 
brand adoption name changes and the radical name changes. — = not applicable.   
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